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The fallowing essay is based on presentations given
recently at the University of Michigan, Harvard
Law School and the Fletche,· School of Law and
Diplomacy. While most citations have been removed
for publication here, the author gratefully
acknowledges the work of Mark Osiel, whose
article, "Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of
Administrative Massacre," 144 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 463 (1995), inspired
much of the analysis here.

On May 25, 1993, acting under the same powers it had used to
authorize the Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council
established the first international war crimes tribunal since postWorld War II trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo. This "independent"
international tribunal, with jurisdiction to prosecute persons
responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian law

have been inspired by the perceived
"lessons" of Nuremberg. My thesis is that
the Nuremberg model, while instructive,
is misleading and that an overly faithful
attempt to replicate Nuremberg may be
a mistake.

committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991,
was soon followed by a similar one for recent atrocities in Rwanda.
In both cases "the decision to bypass the arduous and probably
inconclusive path of attempting to negotiate a multilateral treaty in
favor of acting by Council fiat was taken on the ground of
"necessity," namely, the fear that any other alternative would have
taken such a long time that any hope of convicting the guilty would
have perished along with the evidence of their crimes.
Although the setting up of the judicial,
prosecutorial and secretariat organs for the
Balkan tribunal took considerable time,
today, in accordance with a 34-article
"statute" proposed by the Secretary-General
and adopted by the Security Council, two
trial chambers and one appellate chamber
consisting of a total of 11 judges are in
session at The Hague. The judges, elected
by the General Assembly from a list
prepared by the Security Council, consist of
nationals of Egypt, Italy, Canada, Nigeria,
France, China, the United States, Costa
Rica, Pakistan, Australia, and Malaysia. The
judges approved rules of procedure and
evidence in February 1994 and, by the
spring of 1997, a three-judge trial chamber
had successfully concluded the first
international "war crimes" trial in 50 years.
In Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Case No.
IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, May 7,
1997), the tribunal rendered a guilty verdict

on 11 of 31 counts originally charged
against a Bosnian Serb and former cafe
owner. Portions of the Tadic trial were
televised on Court TV (which billed it, with
some justice, as the "real trial of the
century").
While other trials are now going on at
The Hague, at the time of Tadic's conviction
fewer than 100 individuals had been
indicted - compared to the thousands
likely to have been involved in the massive
"ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans. Moreover,
of those indicted, only seven are in custody,
while the most prominent, Milosevic and
Karadzic, remain free. Nor are the prospects
for improvements on these numbers great
- given the continuing reluctance of
relevant government authorities to
cooperate with the tribunal. Nonetheless,
there is now renewed hope that NATO-led
forces will seek out and arrest at least some
indicted individuals.
While it is too early to assess the likely
legacy of the Balkan war crimes tribunal, it
is clear that both its creation and its goals

From the start, this tribunal has
embodied the long-frustrated hopes of
many international lawyers for the
application of the rule of law to notorious
crimes of state. For many of the disciples of
Grotius, proceeding with these ad hoc
courts in Rwanda and in the former
Yugoslavia is but the first step toward an
eventual permanent international criminal
court (now under serious negotiation
within the United Nations). The mythic
goals for the Balkan tribunal, drawn from
those that inspired the high profile trials of
22 major Nazi figures at Nuremberg, go far
beyond the aims of the ordinary criminal
prosecution. It is said that these trials,
properly conducted, further the aims of:
General Deterrence - to threaten
those in positions of power and make them
stop the threat and deployment of violence
to achieve national ends;
Punishment - to make atonement
possible for the culprits and honor the
dead;
Compensation and Rehabilitation -

to provide mechanisms, along with the
criminal proceedings, to enable victims and
their families to receive needed
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psychological counseling, identify remains,
restore lost property, and otherwise help
heal wounds;
The Restoration of Public Order to channel the thirst for revenge to more
peaceful dispute settlement;
The Reinvigoration of the International and National Rule of Law to affirm the Nuremberg Principles at the
international level while restoring faith in
law generally;
The Preservation of Collective
Memory - to preserve an accurate
historical account of barbarism in the hopes
of preventing its recurrence;
and, perhaps most important,
National Reconciliation - to restore
the lost civility of tom societies.
Nuremberg has also inspired the vision
of how the Balkan prosecutions would
accomplish these aims. Advocates of Balkan
war crimes prosecutions, in government
and in academia, argue that the purpose of
making war criminals answer for their
crimes is, as Ted Meron wrote in Foreign
Affairs ("Answering for War Crimes,"
Feb. 1997), to "assign guilt to individual
perpetrators, rather than allowing blame to
fall on entire groups and nations." By
punishing the guilty (and only the guilty),
all the Nuremberg-inspired goals are
expected to come into place: those in
positions of power will be deterred from
further violence; the guilty will be given the
chance to atone; the injured a way to be
mollified; public order and respect for the
rule of law will be restored.
The advocates of todays Balkan
prosecutions argue that we need to emulate,
as much as the differing conditions in the
Balkans will allow, the forceful application
of the "rule of law" of the victorious allies in
war-tom postwar Germany Our task, they
argue, is to convince the peoples of the
former Yugoslavia that the tribunal is as
serious an enterprise as Nuremberg was.
Thus, it is argued that we must get NATOled forces to use force as necessary to arrest
those who local authorities refuse to give up
and that the tribunals prosecutors must
courageously indict the highest leaders
responsible regardless of the political
repercussions since the conviction of only
inconsequential "small fry" delegitimizes the
entire process. The foremost supporters of
the tribunal argue that criminal
prosecutions need to reach deeply into all
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levels of Balkan society to identify and
punish all those who have been complicit
with evil - even if such a thorough-going
search for the truth requires interminable
trials and expensive investigations. It is
argued that only a serious, "even handed"
effort which spares no expense and no
individual can expect to live up to the
expectations set by Nuremberg.
Like Nuremberg, the Balkan tribunal is
built on the premise that criminal
convictions help achieve national
reconciliation because they exonerate those
not in the dock; that is, because war crimes
trials unite the population in collective
revulsion against the barbarism of a few and
encourage collective solidarity in support of
the civilized nature of the process itself.
Convictions are seen as providing "cathartic
group therapy" to reestablish a lost national
(and international) consensus: the contrast
between the rules of law by which the
defendants are judged and the barbarity of
what they are shown to have done is said to
encourage a unified sense of outrage against
the guilty, with corresponding simultaneous
satisfaction toward the civilized process
that branded the criminals.
The Nuremberg model assumes that
everyone will agree with the legitimacy of
the tribunal and its verdicts; that social
solidarity will be restored through
invocation of shared values. The premise, in
short, is that a forum issuing verdicts with
universal legitimacy will restore lost civility
- at least for the torn countries directly at
issue and perhaps for the international
community as a whole. It is assumed that
war crimes tribunals achieve "closure" by
convincing all those of good faith of the
guilt of those convicted, by channelling
communal anger solely at those individuals,
and by keeping retribution safely inside the
courtroom. In the words of a former
prosecutor at the Balkan tribunal, Minna
Schrag, by finding identifiable individuals
accountable, the rest of the community is
not "associated with collective guilt .... "
As she puts it, the trials help prevent
generations growing up saying "its the
Serbs or the Croats or any other group that
did this to my father ... " (Columbia Law
School Report, at 25, Autumn 1996).
Ted Meron of New York University agrees,
asserting in Foreign Affairs (Feb. 1997) that
the process will thereby diffuse "ethnic
tensions and assist in peacemaking."

At the same time, the creators of the
Balkan tribunal have sought to avoid the
perceived "flaws" of Nuremberg and Tokyo.
Fifty years of revisionism have taken a toll
on the perceptions of Nurembergs "success"
and the creators of todays tribunals were
acutely aware of the critiques. Prominent
critits, especially German lawyers but
including the chief deputy prosecutor at
Nuremberg, Telford Taylor, have
complained that the Nuremberg process
was tainted by "victor's justice" since its
rules, bench and prosecution team were all
dominated by lawyers from the United
States and arrogant notions of "American
exceptionalism." Those trials were said to
be marred by the application of "double
standards" since no charges were brought
against the Allies despite evidence of
violations of humanitarian war (including
the fire bombing of Dresden, the
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and
the Katyn Forest massacre of Polish POWs
by the U.S.S.R.). Many have suggested that
the noble goals of the Nuremberg tribunal
were compromised from the outset by the
"irony of August 8, 1945": the date that the
allies signed the London Charter to
establish the Nuremberg tribunal was also
the date that the United States dropped its
second nuclear bomb on Nagasaki.
Nuremberg'.s critics have also argued that
those trials were otherwise unfair and
biased since some defendants were
convicted in absentia, while others
encountered "trial by ambush" - i.e., an
expedited criminal process on the basis of
unfamiliar rules and based on documentary
evidence primarily in the control of the
prosecution with defense lawyers being
accorded minimal time for preparation.
There have been recriminations that these
defendants were charged with "newly
minted" international crimes, in violation of
the universal principle against ex post facto
imposition of criminal penalties.
Nuremberg defendants were, after all,
essentially the first individuals to be
convicted on novel theories that
international law prevails over domestic and

that individuals in the service of their
government may nonetheless be subject to
individual criminal liability. Moreover,
critics complained that these defendants
were the first to be charged with crimes of
"aggression" (premised dubiously on
violations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact),
"crimes against humanity," and other
"international" crimes that seemed
particularly novel from a civil law
perspective, such as "conspiracy" Even
graver charges of overly hasty, and perhaps
even racist, judgments have since been
leveled against the Tokyo trials organized by
General Douglas MacArthur.
Revisionists have even questioned the
premise that the Nuremberg trials did much
to preserve collective memory in the service
of history To at least some critics, the
Nuremberg trial records make for a
fundamentally flawed, even false, historical
account that is grossly unfair to the victims
of the Holocaust. Some attribute the
problem to Chief Prosecutor Justice Robert
H. Jackson's decision to make the waging of
"aggressive" war the linchpin of all
Nuremberg charges, a theory of the case
that seemed to make the Holocaust merely
"incidental" to the waging of World War II
instead of making Nazi horrors the focus of
attention. By, for example, arguing that Nazi
concentration camps were effectively tools
of the German war effort and by failing to
bring charges or to present evidence of Nazi
crimes committed before the official onset
of interstate aggression (such as under the
pre-1939 racial purity laws), the
Nuremberg prosecution, it is argued,
obscured the real scope and depth of the
Holocaust. By focusing exclusively on the
theory that Nazi war criminals were merely
an especially evil collection of "gangsters"
bent solely on aggressive conquest,
Nuremberg, it is argued, glossed over the
ethnic, religious, and racial underpinnings
of the Holocaust. In part because the
testimonies of victims were deemed
unnecessary, the anti-Jewish, anti-gay, antigypsy aspects of German policies were
rendered less visible. These have been only
rediscovered by revisionist historians who
have been aided by, among other things,
more victim-oriented trial prosecutions
(such as Israel's prosecution of Eichman).
For creators of the new Balkan tribunal,
for whom Nuremberg loomed as an
inescapable precedent, each one of these

Nuremberg-inspired critiques - the
problems of victor's justice, unfairness to
defendants, and historical inaccuracy needed to be remedied. They responded by
creating a body that they believed would
not be subject to the charge of "victor's
justice" since it would be established by the
"world community" and not merely the
action of vengeful victors. To further deflect
charges of "double standards," they
attempted to ensure that all those who
committed crimes in the former Yugoslavia,
regardless of national origin, ethnicity or
religion, would be subject to prosecution and by an international bench and
prosecution teams that could not be
accused of national bias.
To prevent charges of unfairness,
modem international human rights
standards on behalf of criminal defendants
were expressly incorporated into the
tribunal's statute and into its rules of
procedure and evidence. To further level the
playing field between prosecution and
defense, the Balkan tribunal borrowed
considerably from the orality of common
law proceedings (including its procedures
for cross examination), incorporated the
possibility of appeals, and anticipated the
need for lawyers' training in the tribunal's
novel procedures. In response to the
illegitimacy of ex post facto imposition of
criminal liability, they restricted the
tribunal's jurisdiction to crimes based on
"rules of international humanitarian law
which are beyond any doubt part of
customary law," thereby attempting to limit
the tribunal's reach to international crimes
that, while novel at Nuremberg and Tokyo,
now have a fifty-year-old pedigree. Gone
were the most criticized aspects of
Nuremberg from a modem human rights
perspective: the death penalty, liability for
membership in a "criminal organization,"
and the possibility of trials in absentia. On
the other hand, rules providing for the
counselling of victims, the protection of
witnesses, and the possibility for court
ordered restoration of stolen property
responded to modem sensitivities toward
the rights of victims.
The Balkan tribunal's emphasis on
victims also responds to the criticism that
Nuremberg had "dishonored" the memory
of Holocaust survivors. Perhaps with this
critique in mind, the prosecutors in the
Tadic case spent what seemed to some
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courtroom observers an inordinate amount
of time at the outset placing their case
against the defendant within the broader
context of the modern history of the former
Yugoslavia. In addition to the usual
"perpetrator"-driven story which
prosecutors are required to present, the
prosecutors in the Tadic case seemed aware
of their debt to history: they began their
"historic trial" with a six day-long history
lesson presented through the testimony of
learned academics.
Despite all the ostensible "improvements"
vis-a-vis Nuremberg and Tokyo, the
legitimacy of the Balkan tribunal remains
very much in doubt. In one sense the
shadow of Nuremberg still looms large as each one of the criticisms faced by that
earlier body finds a contemporary echo.
Despite (or because o0 the attention paid to
the rights of defendants, the Balkan tribunal
faces unresolved tensions with respect to
the proper balancing between the rights of
defendants and victims. Thus, an August
1995 preliminary ruling in the Tadic case
that permitted the prosecutor to withhold
from the accused or his lawyers the identity
of some witnesses who would otherwise
refuse to testify has led to considerable
criticism, especially from common law
lawyers for whom the right of confrontation
is sacred. On the other hand, victims'
groups anxious for the tribunal to
effectively cope with mass rape charges
(involving as many as 20,000 women) have
found the tribunal's steps to protect
potential witnesses and victims timid and
inadequate. Some may also find troubling
the relatively "light" prison sentences likely
to be imposed on even the most serious
offenders. (Tadic himself, though given a
20-year prison sentence, is likely to serve
only 10 years.)
On the defense side, there are likely to
be continuing fears that "ex post facto"
problems persist despite the assurances
given in the Balkan tribunal's statute.
Already, in the course of the Tadic case,
debates have emerged about the
appropriateness of certain charges especially if one sees the underlying conflict
as an "internal" civil war and not an
"international" conflict. Even in that first
case, the tribunal has, in compliance with
its statute, gone beyond Nuremberg
precedents (strictly understood) to permit
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charges for "crimes against humanity" in the
absence of charges for "aggression." The
tribunal is also likely to make "new law" on
other matters, including the degree of
responsibility owed by "non-governmental"
paramilitary units and the nature of
international criminal responsibility
incurred for mass rape. Should the latter be
charged as crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
violations of the laws and customs of war,
or even "genocide," "conspiracy to commit
genocide," an "attempt to commit
genocide," or "complicity in genocide" (all
possible charges under the tribunal's
jurisdiction)? It seems difficult for the
tribunal to avoid charges that it is making
new law- and imposing "ex post facto"
criminal liability.
Nor is it clear that the creators of the
Balkan tribunal have successfully mediated
the treacherous divides between east and
west or north and south any better than the
Nuremberg or the Tokyo tribunals. Charges
of "double standards," "American
exceptionalism," and "victor's justice" have
been deflected but not altogether avoided.
After all, this tribunal was established
through the innovative reinterpretation of
the Chapter VU powers of the Security
Council under the UN Charter, a decision
taken by an organ dominated by the
Permanent Five, and especially by the
United States. Developing countries, not
entitled to a Council veto, have expressed
some discomfort with the resulting risks to
national sovereignty and they have not been
altogether placated by the assurances that
the tribunal will remain "independent" from
the Security Council. No one knows
whether or to what extent a truly
"independent" international criminal
tribunal has been created. No one knows
whether the Security Council retains
residual authority over the tribunal; can the
Council, for example, direct the tribunal
not to prosecute someone among Serbia's
current leadership "for the sake of
international peace and security"? Can the
tribunal tell the Council that such an
interference with the tribunal's functions
would be null and void7 Further, no one,
not even the tribunal, has given a
satisfactory answer as to why the Security
Council can, legally, displace prosecutions
by national courts. No one knows whether

the tribunal has the power to order
governments to turn over witnesses,
defendants, or documents - or what
happens if it tries and fails. To date, the •
tribunal has given nearly as many answers
to such fundamental j\.irisdictional issues as
there are nationalities represented on its
bench. Judicial unanimity has been
understandably elusive given the novelties
of the tribunal's creation and the yawning
gaps in international criminal practice.
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But the specter of Nuremberg is
deceptive. While it is true that the Balkan
tribunal faces many issues reminiscent of
those faced by earlier war crimes
prosecutions, its greatest challenge is
unique: the Balkan tribunal is expected to
fashion Nuremberg-styled justice in the
absence of D-day.
Victor's justice had its merits. Whatever
else might be said about Nuremberg, the
trial of the major Nazi war criminals and
the proceedings that followed were not
solely directed at "small fry." Tadic, the
Balkan tribunal's first defendant, is,
however, no Hermann Goering. In contrast
to Nuremberg's impressive line-up of
defendants, the Balkan tribunal's list of
indictments is likely to be distinguished
by the number of high profile defendants
that it will not be able to reach. Its
"selective" prosecutions are already drawing
complaints that the process "mocks justice."
This difference, more than any other,
casts doubt on the Nuremberg-inspired
hopes for this tribunal. Deterrence is
rendered doubtful by doubts about the
viability of the criminal law to cope with
the sheer enormity of likely culprits and the
absence of an effective police power to
capture them. Even if a NATO "strike force"
to capture war criminals were created, how
would the rest of the Balkans be pacified
without massive military occupation?
Moreover, the detention of even prominent
leaders will not always deter fanatical
followers; a charismatic leader can just as
easily inspire continued violence from

inside a jail cell. Is effective deterrence
possible when whole societies have been
complicit in genocide - in the absence of
military occupation by an alien power?
Even national governments, with
considerably more effective control over
their own territories than the UN now
exercises over the Balkans, have often
demurred in the face of such dilemmas and
granted general amnesties. But if deterrence
is unlikely, so are the prospects for effective
punishment.
For the same reasons, the goals of
compensation and rehabilitation seem
scarcely attainable. Victims are not likely to
get much relief from these criminal
prosecutions since the tribunal does not
now have and is not likely to ever have the
resources to comfort, much less provide real
psychological counseling for survivors. The
few trials that do occur are not likely to do
much to restore public order and sporadic
prosecutions are not likely to forestall acts
of vengeance or mob violence as victims
come across their former torturers and
rapists. Nor will many victims and
witnesses willingly come forward if they live
in areas where retaliation remains likely;
significantly, none of the prosecutions
witnesses in the Tadic case lived in areas
under Serbian control. For these and other

reasons, the conditions in the former
Yugoslavia prompt skepticism about the
likelihood that the tribunal will inspire
renewed respect for the Nuremberg
Principles or the rule of law.
Given the realities it faces, the prospect
that the Balkan tribunal will secure national
reconciliation through "closure" seems
particularly farfetched. How can a process
that is likely to convict only a handful of
those culpable and that is not even likely to
reach their superiors, "exonerate" anyone7
Further, unlike Nuremberg's prosecutors,
this tribunal's accusers need the cooperation
of willing witnesses; relatively few documents
attest to the atrocities committed. But such
witnesses pose challenges that prosecutors
did not face at Nuremberg. In the former
Yugoslavia (and in Rwanda as well), live
witnesses are likely to replicate, inside the
courtroom, the religious or ethnic divisions
that have characterized the underlying
conflict. The Tadic case pitted Serb
witnesses for the defense against Moslem
witnesses for the prosecution. In this
context - a trial judged in the absence of a
jury and solely by learned judges convictions or acquittals will be largely
based on credibility findings rendered by a
group that does not include a Serb, a
Moslem or a Croat. Reactions to these

verdicts are likely to fall along familiar
ethnic/religious lines; they are not likely to
generate unified societal consensus - at
least not in all cases.
Worse still, the Balkan tribunal cannot
rely on the universal legitimacy of its
establishment or its procedures to overcome
the doubts of the skeptical. It was created
by a super-power-dominated UN organ
viewed with some suspicion by the rest of
the world. It adheres to novel procedures
that constitute an untested melange of rules
borrowed from both common law and civil
law traditions whose interpretation divides
the judges charged with their application. It
should not surprise if verdicts in these cases
fail to draw universal praise or inspire
instant consensus.
Indeed the very notion of "closure"
through judicially created legitimacy seems
dated today, the product of rapidly
vanishing legal romanticism. For many
people in the United States the idea that
courts and lawyers stand as a socially
unifying bulwark to protect civilization
seems a bit naive in a post-modern, postRodney King, post-OJ world. Many see
what goes on in courtrooms as only rarely
praiseworthy attempts to secure neutral
justice and more often as thoroughly
calculated, cynical, preconstructed
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maneuvers that reflect (and sometimes
inflame) societys prejudices. Many doubt
that all are really equal before the law;
skeptics openly question the notion that
race does not count in our courtrooms.
The prospect that the international
community, with all its divisions, can render
"neutral" justice en mass in instances
involving thousands of possible defendants
inflamed by religious or ethnic hatred
seems, in this light, terribly quixotic. Trials,
whether here or abroad, do not often
generate instant social consensus.

What then is the argument for war
crimes trials in the Balkans under prevailing
circumstances? What is the case that can be
made to justify sporadic international war
crimes trials, often of "small fry" like
Dusko Tadic, while the majority of
wrongdoers, including most of those who
gave the orders, go free? Is there any
justification, in law or policy, for such
"selective" prosecutions?
The hard case for the Balkan war crimes
tribunal needs to be made on the basis of
redefined goals - not the mythic ones
inspired by Nuremberg.
First, with respect to deterrence, it is
necessary to remember that the starting
point is not, before war crimes indictments
are issued, an entirely blank slate. Long
before the Balkan tribunal was established,
the media, individual governments, and the
UN Commission of Inquiry had already
identified numerous crimes and likely
culprits. The question is not whether war
crimes will deter crimes that no one would
otherwise know about but whether
punishing some crimes and some
individuals people already know about is at
all important. If nothing is done about
known or rumored crimes and culprits,
does this not induce or encourage further
violence by those who are not prosecuted as
well as by those seeking vengeance?
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Whether or not war crimes trials can be
said to "deter," the punishment of known
crimes at least prevents them from being
cited as an example of what one "can get
away with." We need to ask whether, given
what is already known, the failure to
attempt to prosecute those we can reach
encourages or induces violence.
Second, with respect to punishment, the
question is whether those who are likely to
be reached by the tribunal merit criminal
sanction or whether the failure to reach
those who are presumed to be "more
culpable" renders the punishment of "small
fry" illegitimate. Those who complain about
"selectivity" in this context need to be more
precise about the nature of their complaint.
Punishment for war crimes is undoubtedly "selective" at many levels. National
courts have varied tremendously with
respect to their reactions to violations of
humanitarian law by their own nationals;
indeed "selective" national prosecutions for
war crimes seem to be the norm (see, for
example, the United States and the
treatment of alleged atrocities by its troops
in Viet Nam). The international community
is certainly not better. The Balkan tribunal's
statute (like Nurembergs Charter itselO, is
limited in scope: it only deals with acts
which occurred after 1991. Does this
temporal limitation - and the underlying
failure to reach anyone guilty of comparable
acts before that date - undermine the
legitimacy of punishing those guilty of post1991 acts? Further, the UN has seen fit to
establish tribunals only for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda but not for Haiti,
Iraq, Cambodia or any of a number of other
places; does its failure undermine the
legitimacy of its efforts in the Balkans? More
broadly, international humanitarian law
seems to reach only some acts - such as
indiscriminate targeting of civilians by scud
missiles but apparently not, for example,
aerial bombardment (as by the United
States over Baghdad in 1991), nor, at least
in the view of nuclear powers, the threat or
use of nuclear weapons. ls all of
humanitarian law therefore suspect because
it is "selective" along north/south lines? The
Balkan tribunal is likely to remain selective
in that it may actually prosecute only some
of those who committed the brutal acts and
not many others, including politically well
connected "higher ups" who gave the

orders. Is the last kind of "selectivity" so
much worse than the others? ls this kind of
selectivity so fatal that the tribunal should
close up shop?
I suspect that many do not find the
conviction of actual tdrturers, murderers,
and rapists (whatever the context) to be
unfairly illegitimate. In fact, victims may
derive considerably more satisfaction from
seeing their actual torturer in the dock than
from seeing that person's commander who
gave the impersonal order. Some may even
claim that there is greater merit to devoting
scarce resources to punishing low level
functionaries who actually inflict crimes on
other human beings since exposing both
the banality of such individuals and their
apparent indifference to others' pain tells us
more about how such barbarisms can
become routinized or widespread.
Quite apart from these arguments, what
precisely is the moral or legal argument that
makes this last kind of selectivity more
objectionable than any of the others7 Why
is it so illegitimate to punish the actual
torturer simply because we do not reach
his/her superior? Surely the reasons for
selective prosecutions also matter. It is one
thing to accuse the tribunal or its
prosecutors of not fairly and evenly
applying the law through the issuance of
indictments in one case but not another; it
is quite another matter where "selective"
prosecutions result not from biased
indictments or investigations but from the
failure to secure arrests of some individuals
or from the inability to collect evidence
from unwilling government sources. Even
within effective domestic legal systems such
failures of "political will" occur frequently,
without necessarily undermining the
legitimacy of those prosecutions which do
occur.
Third, the prominence of Nuremberg
need not lull us into giving international
criminal prosecutions greater significance
than they deserve. Neither after World War
II nor at any time before have nations relied
exclusively or even primarily on
international criminal trials to achieve the
mythic but worthy goals that have been
articulated for modern international
tribunals. Even after World War II, the

number of such prosecutions have been
dwarfed by a myriad of other efforts in
pursuit of deterrence, punishment, national
reconciliation, et al. It is self-defeating to
rely on the Balkan trials alone to achieve
what is being sought in a number of other
fora and through a variety of other
processes - from the diplomatic level
(as through the Dayton peace process and
beyond), to the World Court (as in Bosnia's
case against Serbia and Montenegro and the
latter's counterclaim); from other international organizations (including the
Security Council, its sanctions committees,
and numerous human rights bodies), to
non-governmental organizations (such as
the Red Cross). Attaining some of these
goals may even be possible through
national courts. Thus, some of the rape
victims of the conflict in Bosnia are now
seeking damages from Karadzic through a
civil suit in New York district court (Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 2nd Cir. 1996).
While it is fair to ask whether all these goals
are equally furthered by simultaneous
actions in all of these fora, it is also
reasonable to consider whether some of the
mythic goals enumerated for the tribunal
can be better achieved elsewhere.
Consider, for example, the prospect of
securing compensation and rehabilitation
for victims. The Balkan tribunal seems illequipped to provide victims much in the
way of recompense, either in damages or
lost property The tribunal may not even
provide victims with significant
psychological relief since it is not clear that
very many of its trials (even if "many"
occur) will provide occasions for the large
numbers of survivors of "ethnic cleansing"
to unburden themselves and tell their
stories. Whatever else might be said of it,
the civil lawsuit in New York against
Karadzic seems a more likely venue for
such matters. Certainly the issue presented
in that case - proving damages caused by
Karadzic's alleged acts to a potentially large
number of claimants - seems much more
suited to the telling of victims' stories and
the appropriate expression of judicial
solicitude toward their plight. Such a
proceeding, driven by a need to at least
pronounce the amount of compensation

which in justice is owed to victims
(compared to a proceeding seeking
primarily to identify the culprit), is less
susceptible to judicial timidity for fear of
imposing ex post facto criminal liability and
is more receptive to airing at least some of
the consequences of the gendered nature of
"ethnic cleansing."
International criminal prosecutions need
to be seen as only a part, perhaps not even
a very significant part, of the spectrum of
activities that have always been pursued to
achieve the goals inspired by Nuremberg.
WWll's tribunals cannot be credited with
achieving all or even a significant part of the
goals which were articulated for their
creation - and this was not merely because
those tribunals contained severe flaws.
Within nation states, the judicial branch,
traditionally the weakest, is not expected to
carry the weight of governance; this is all
the more true internationally (See David P
Forsythe, "Politics and the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia," 5
Criminal Law Forum 401, at 421 [1994]).
International criminal tribunals should not
be expected to carry as much freight as
their advocates suggest. Attempts to make
them do so - whatever the cost - may
endanger alternative processes and
undermine possibly competing goals for the
international community and the United
Nations.
Fourth, we need a more realistic account
of what the ciminal process can be expected
to achieve to preserve collective memory
Despite the attempts made at the Tadic trial
to provide a history lesson during the
course of a trial, a criminal trial is ill-suited
for this purpose. As Mark Osiel has noted,
the adversarial nature of the courtroom and
the need to play to the public (if not to a
jury) leads to the telling of diametrically
opposed, over-simplified stories by both
sides - tales told with an eye to the
restricted nature of rules of evidence and
the precise charges at issue. The whole
purpose of the prosecution's case is to make
it appear that the individual defendant in
the dock is uniquely responsible; the
defense attempts the opposite. The
prosecutor certainly does not have a motive
to indict the broader society, to truly
examine the moral complexity involved in
even horrific crimes, to tell more than one
linear story at a time. And while the defense

may try to mount a broader indictment,
such a one-sided attempt is not likely to
lead to balanced history. Criminal trials
inevitably produce individualist/perpetrator
accounts filled with the bright lines skilled
historians try to avoid _'.__ indeed, that is
their point.
It is true, nonetheless, that war crimes
trials provide one way in which an accurate
collective memory is rendered more likely
While Nuremberg presented a one-sided
picture of the Holocaust, it presented, and
more important, preserved an important
record of some aspects of those years.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with such
revisionist accounts of the Holocaust as
Daniel Goldhagen's - whose recent
portrayal of Hitler's Willing Executioners is
diametrically opposed to the perpetrator
accounts portrayed at Nuremberg - the
fact remains that Goldhagen's efforts might
not have been possible but for the
collection and preservation of documents
necessitated by Nuremberg and postNuremberg trials. Goldhagen's and other
historians' revisionist accounts are as much
a product of Nuremberg as they are
responses to it. It seems equally clear that
the effort to bring indictments in the former
Yugoslavia has led to the preservation of at
least some evidence of barbarism that
would otherwise have perished. Whenever
the sad recent history of the former
Yugoslavia is written, what has so far been
produced at The Hague seems destined to
be a part of it.
Essentially, the historical preservation/
collective memory goal needs to be more
modestly made: war crimes trials are one
tool, among many, for the preservation of
history.
Fifth, we need to reexamine our concept
of how war crimes trials help bring about
national reconciliation. As Mark Osiel again
reminds us, trials are occasions that initiate
conversations between otherwise unwilling
antagonists. The value of trials actually
increases the greater the pre-existing
antagonism between the parties since the
greater their mutual hatred the less likely
such opponents are to seek occasions for
dialogue except when forced to in a court of
law. Trial confrontations may be, at least in
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the short run, the only occasions for ongoing conversations between sworn
enemies. Further, the constricted nature of
trials, though not always conducive to
accurate history, is better at channelling
disputes into narrow, legalistic grooves.
A criminal trial is necessarily about whether
certain acts have or have not been
committed; about whether particular
evidence does or does not exist. It is not
about, for example, finding the "truth"
about ethnic or racial stereotypes. When
convincingly reached, a conviction can help
terminate debates about whether a
defendant is guilty, but even a conviction
does not close off other debates. A trial may
instead provoke other disagreements totally
at odds with notions of "closure."
For these reasons, as Osiel has noted,
the prosecution of war criminals should not
be portrayed as "group therapy" intended to
secure instant closure or societal consensus.
Especially when such trials involve ethnic
or religious conflicts, the prospects for such
broad "consensus" are slim to none. Such
conflicts are complex events requiring a
lengthy cooling off period, a thorough
airing of grievances. Such grievances are not
likely to be aired, much less satisfactorily
resolved, in the course of a trial or even a
lengthy series of trials. On the contrary,
with respect to such complex societal
problems, trials may usefully promote, not
close off, thorough discussion between
participants and government officials, and,
if the trial is important enough and
publicized enough, among the general
public. Whether here or abroad, criminal
(and some civil) trials may be better seen as
discursive phenomena that provide an
occasion for, and inspire, public debates.
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The purpose of the Balkan tribunal may
be precisely the opposite of what has been
suggested by Minna Schrag or Ted Meron.
What we achieve in prosecuting war
criminals may not be to convince anyone
that we have managed to capture the only
culprits. Such trials may force continuing
discussions of "collective guilt ," they
encourage, not discourage, questions about
the comparative "group guilt" of Serbs and
Croats. War crimes trials may keep alive
difficult issues of the meaning and scope of
complicity. They may encourage youngsters
in the former Yugoslavia to ask their parents
a few years hence, "what exactly were you
doing in 1992 mom and dad? Did you
support the people doing these terrible
things7" Even the trial of one "low level"
local torturer can be the start of a national
conversation .
Trials and verdicts that rile people up,
that prompt accusations and counteraccusations among neighbors and even
within families may be justifiable. In
societies as fractured as the former
Yugoslavia they may even be necessary The
argument for Balkan tribunals based on the
prospect for national reconciliation needs to
be made not on simplistic assumptions that
trials encourage "closure" but on Osiel's
more counterintuitive premise that
contentious courtrooms prompting outrage
are preferable to sweeping issues under the
rug where they simmer and ultimately
explode in less controllable settings.
In this view, the actual verdicts, their
number, who stands accused, and even the
legitimacy of the forum may ultimately be
less important than that some
institutionalized process exists to assure
public discussion of how such events

happened and who might be responsible.
In some cases, the resulting verdicts may
even inspire attempts to retaliate on one
side or another. As we have seen within the
United States (fortunately at a much less
bloody level) trials - and their verdicts can inflame. They may even prompt riots.
But the alternative - societies where
racially divisive issues are not raised in the
relatively safe confines of a courtroom seems even less likely to achieve national
reconciliation.
Finally, we should do well to remind
ourselves who "small fry" are in this
context. In most countries of the world
someone charged with the acts Tadic has
been convicted of would be on par with the
worst serial killer. No, he is not Goering,
but it is difficult to see an enduring society
being built on impunity for such crimes.
This last, the argument from morality, may
be the most compelling reason for
continuing to press for these prosecutions
despite the evident difficulties.
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